In this article, we demonstrate that the asymmetric key-based architecture for securing wireless sensor networks recently introduced by Haque et al. is insecure under impersonation attack, since it does not provide authentication semantics. In addition, we show that, for the scheme to work correctly, the resulting key distribution construction should be symmetric and group-wise.
Introduction
The security of wireless sensor networks (WSNs) is a challenging and exciting issue that has attracted a great deal of recent attention. This has resulted in many research contributions. These contributions considered both symmetric and asymmetric key based algorithms, as potential solutions. In particular, recent work questioned the long-standing claim that the asymmetric key based cryptography (AKC) is inefficient on resource-constrained sensor nodes and demonstrated relevant efficiency [1] [2] . These results motivated the need for new designs of public key primitives suited to WSN settings [3] in addition to conventional public key primitives, such as key authentication [4] , key revocation [5] , and key distribution [2] .
Recently, Haque et al. introduced asymmetric key-based architecture (AKA) to secure WSN [6] . AKA uses a linear construction based on the pseudo-inverse of a matrix to generate symmetric keys. These keys are ultimately used to secure communication between nodes and the base-station and to distribute keys required for node-to-node communication. AKA is asserted to be computationally more secure than the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol.
Our original contribution in this paper is twofold: first, we show that AKA is insecure by demonstrating that secret parameters at the side of one node, which are used to derive the secret key, can be derived by any malicious entity that impersonates the base-station. Second, we show that, in order for AKA to work correctly, the overall settings should be the group-wise symmetric key model. Finally, to avoid some of the criticisms directed at AKA, we introduce a proposal for a recovery mechanism.
The structure of this article is as follows. We first describe AKA and its basic assumptions in section 2 (more details are in [6] ). In section 3, we analyze AKA security. In section 4, we introduce related work from the literature and our work in relation to them. This is followed by concluding remarks in section 5.
Related Works
The key distribution problem in WSNs has been thoroughly treated in the literature. Particularly, several constructions are introduced based on computationally hard problems. For instance, Liu et al. introduced a scheme that utilizes bivariate symmetric polynomials for key distribution [7] that exploits the difficulty of the polynomial factorization problem. Du et al. introduced a scheme that utilizes a symmetric matrix construction for key distribution [8] that exploits the linear independence merit of vectors to the solvability of linear systems (that is, difficulty of solving a system in n variables given t<n equations). These original works have been extended, improved, and utilized for special scenarios, as in [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] , and [14] . Other key assignment schemes to improve connectivity and resiliency are introduced. For instance, the early work of Eschenauer and Gligor [15] uses a random key assignment method. Blackburn et al. goes one step further, by utilizing Costas arrays to improve resiliency and reduce overhead [16] .
Overview of AKA
AKA does not follow the conventional asymmetric architectures that utilize asymmetric algorithms to distribute symmetric keys (session keys) in an authentic manner. That is, AKA uses symmetric keys to distribute other symmetric keys to be used to decrypt communication traffic between nodes in a symmetric manner that makes the naming of AKA inaccurate. Technically, AKA consists of two phases: key derivation and secure communication. In key derivation, AKA utilizes the pseudo-inverse of a matrix to establish a secret shared key between any node and the base station without revealing any of these entities' secret information. The non-unique pseudo-inverse of a matrix Taking these properties into account, the key derivation phase between a node Alice and the base station, which is considered a trusted third party (TTP), is performed based on the description in Fig 1. Participants: node (Alice) and base-station (TTP).
1. Alice: generate When two nodes, namely Alice and Bob, need to communicate securely using the assumption that they already both share secret keys with the base station (TTP), the procedure in Fig. 2 is performed. A message intended for Bob from Alice is decrypted by a decryption key passed to Bob from the TTP in a secure manner.
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Participants: node (Alice) and base-station (Bob) who share a group generator g and a prime p . as the shared key. The keys in both of step (2) and step (3) are equal. 
Security Analysis

Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
We touch upon the security of Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol (D-H) [17] that is used to demonstrate the security of AKA in [6] , before detailing AKA security. The D-H protocol is a symmetric key establishment protocol that enables two parties to construct a key without prior knowledge of each other, as shown in Fig. 3 [17] . D-H protocol security is based on the size of the group from which the prime p is generated that also determines the size of the resulting key. The difficulty of breaking D-H is equivalent to the difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm problem (DLP). Based on the Pohlig-Hellman algorithm, the time complexity to solve the general DLP has the complexity of ) ( p O . For instance, a 128 bit key provides a 64 bit security level. For special groups, from which p is generated, the general number field sieve (GNFS) can be applied to solve the DLP with complexity of
This form of complexity can be represented in O-notation as [7] :
A demonstration of the complexity to solve DLP for several key size values based on different algorithms is shown in Table 1 . Contrary to that shown in [6] , and as we will show later in this article, AKA can be broken in a linear number of operations. Conversely, DLP is believed to be a hard problem and the best known algorithm to solve such a problem requires exhaustive search. Table 1 illustrates the search space required for different key sizes (in bits) for different algorithms. 
Symmetric versus Asymmetric
Now recall the node-to-node communication in AKA shown in Fig. 2 . After Alice sends an encrypted message to Bob, Bob requests the decryption key from the TTP, which in return sends it to Bob encrypted, using a secret key shared between the TTP and Bob. For this to work, the exchanged key should be the same key shared between the TTP and Alice, since the encryption scheme applied on Alice's side is symmetric; this makes the naming of AKA inaccurate. This limitation in AKA exposes two security problems:
1. Since the key used to encrypt messages from Alice to Bob is the same key used for secure communication between the TTP and Alice, once Bob knows the key passed to him via the TTP he will be able to intercept, decrypt and manipulate messages from
Alice that are not directed to him, unless the key is refreshed each time Alice wants to send a message at the expense of tremendous overhead. 2. Once Alice's key is revealed to Bob, Bob will be able to forge messages and send them to the TTP on behalf of Alice requesting the shared keys between the TTP and any arbitrary node. This will be affordable, since there is provision for authentication between the TTP and nodes.
After the execution of the instantiation of AKA in Fig. 5 , both Alice and Bob will know each other's keys. This will be a critical issue, unless key refreshment is performed immediately each time. Utilizing the above scenarios will enable the participants to gain access to secret information used to generate the keys. 
Possible Countermeasure
The only possible countermeasure for the impersonation attack provided in section 3.2, is to select the parameters carefully, so that the invertibility of the linear construction that results from multiplying the matrix and its pseudo inverse at either side is impossible. That is, if we select n k < , we can always ensure that , then it also cannot compute Eq. (2) and cannot proceed with an impersonation attack. Both key authentication and key refresh processes are needed to mitigate the impact of the attacks in section 3.3. Strong authentication is indeed needed to overcome both attacks in section 3.2 and section 3.3.
On the Existence of a Trusted Third Party
AKA depends greatly in its operation on assuming that the base-station is a trusted third party. In the majority of WSN systems, this assumption is unrealistic for so many reasons. In the following, we mention two of these reasons.
1. One of these reasons is the cost of this assumption. While commercial WSN systems are desired to be reasonably priced, assuming the existence of a TTP in WSN system will be at high cost.
2. The other reason is the deployment scenario. The deployment scenarios of WSN limit the rationality of this assumption since many of these scenarios assume a hostile and adversarial environment as a basic natural assumption which contradicts with the existence of a TTP in the system. Particularly, assuming a hostile environment of deployment implies that any potential attacker can physically capture any entity in the network including the base-station, alter its contents, and act on behalf on it.
For both of the above reasons, among many other reasons, TTP is considered unrational assumption in the majority of WSN systems [7] . However, if the base-station in a WSN is considered a TTP, many traditional key distribution algorithms, that are proven to be secure against several attacks, can be brought to the WSN systems. This for instance includes key distribution centers (KDC) among others [7] [11]. These algorithms, if brought to WSN systems, will minimize several security challenges and at low computational cost that is comparable to the cost of AKA.
Conclusion
In this article, we proved the asymmetric key-based architecture (AKA) for wireless sensor network to be insecure. Particularly, AKA is not based on a computationally hard problem. This makes breaking it in a linear number of operations possible. We suggest the existence of a strong authentication method prior to key establishment and careful selection for AKA's parameters to avoid this.
